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Abstract. When peers rate each other, they may rate inaccurately to
boost their own reputation or unfairly lower another’s. This could be mit-
igated by having a reputation server incentivise accurate ratings with a
reward. However, assigning rewards becomes challenging when ratings
are anonymous, since the reputation server cannot tell which peers to
reward for rating accurately. To address this, we propose an anonymous
peer rating system in which users can be rewarded for accurate rat-
ings, and we formally define its model and security requirements. In our
system ratings are rewarded in batches, so that users claiming their re-
wards only reveal they authored one in this batch of ratings. To ensure
the anonymity set of rewarded users is not reduced, we also split the rep-
utation server into two entities, the Rewarder, who knows which ratings
are rewarded, and the Reputation Holder, who knows which users were
rewarded. We give a provably secure construction satisfying all the se-
curity properties required. For our construction we use a modification of
a Direct Anonymous Attestation scheme to ensure that peers can prove
their own reputation when rating others, and that multiple feedback on
the same subject can be detected. We then use Linkable Ring Signatures
to enable peers to be rewarded for their accurate ratings, while still en-
suring that ratings are anonymous. Our work results in a system which
allows accurate ratings to be rewarded, whilst still providing anonymity
of ratings with respect to the central entities managing the system.
1 Introduction
Anonymity has long been a sought-after property in many cryptographic prim-
itives, such as public-key encryption [5], identity-based encryption [2, 15], and
a defining one in others, such as group signatures [16] and ring signatures [46].
A plethora of more complex protocols, from broadcast encryption [35] to cryp-
tocurrencies [32], have been enhanced by user anonymity.
An example of such protocols are rating systems, also referred to as reputation
systems, in which users can be rated by providing feedback on goods or services,
with the support of a reputation server. Each user has a reputation value based
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on these ratings, which can be used to evaluate their trustworthiness. In this
context, the value of anonymity lies in the fact that users are able to give honest
feedback without fear of repercussions. This may occur when there is a lack of
trust for the reputation server, or when users are concerned about retaliation.
Anonymity has received a great amount of attention in this area and abun-
dant existing literature covers a range of anonymous rating systems in both
the centralised and distributed settings. Distributed systems, e.g., [38], have no
reputation server and use local reputation values, i.e., reputation values created
by users on other users. For example, a user may generate a reputation value
based on feedback from querying other users. This means a user does not have a
unique reputation value, but many other users hold their own reputation value
for them. In this setting, privacy preserving decentralised reputation systems [43]
are designed to maintain anonymity when answering queries from other users.
We focus on centralised systems, since the reputation systems used by most
service providers such as Airbnb, Uber and Amazon are of this type. In the
centralised setting, a central reputation server enrols users and forms reputation
values on these users. In [11, 23, 10, 18, 17] anonymity of a rating is provided to all
except the reputation server, and multiple ratings cannot be given on the same
subject. In [51], multiple reputation servers are used so that anonymity of ratings
holds, unless all reputation servers collude. Other works provide anonymity of
ratings in the presence of a corrupted reputation server [47, 44, 25, 27]. In [3,
8] anonymity is achieved with a different approach. The reputation server still
enrols users, but no longer forms reputations. Instead users collect tokens based
on anonymous ratings from other users and prove their own reputation.
Whilst the benefits of anonymity are clear, it is also understood that this same
property can provide an opportunity for malicious users to misbehave. They may
“bad mouth” other users, for instance competitors, giving dishonest negative
feedback to these users to decrease their reputation. Or they may collude and give
each other positive feedback in order to inflate their own reputation. To avoid
this, the system can provide either a mechanism to revoke the malicious user’s
anonymity (typically achieved through a traceability property), or incentivize
good behaviour by rewarding users. The rating systems proposed so far approach
this issue via user tracing. Indeed, in schemes where the reputation server can
de–anonymise ratings [11, 23, 18, 17], inaccurate ratings can be punished.
We take a different approach by rewarding honest ratings in anonymous peer
rating systems, where users are peers and anonymously rate each other. Examples
include peer-to-peer file sharing [1], collaborative knowledge production [40, 14,
28], and shared knowledge of internet and software vulnerabilities [30, 48]. In such
systems the rewarding approach works well since raters are also participating
within the system and so have an interest in rating accurately to increase their
reputation through rewards. The use of incentives to encourage accurate feedback
has already been discussed in [42, 50], but ratings are not anonymous.
Privacy-preserving incentive schemes [39, 33, 29, 9, 12], where users can be
incentivised anonymously without their transactions being linked, have also been
proposed. In [39] it is described how such incentives could contribute towards a
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reputation value. However, these schemes do not capture the ability to reward
accurate ratings. Firstly, ratings must be incentivised as they are submitted, at
which point it is not known whether a rating is accurate. When accurate ratings
are determined it is then difficult to return the incentive to the relevant user.
Secondly, in [33, 29, 9, 12], a user’s balance is updated each time a user receives
an incentive. However, a user may have submitted k accurate rating on other
users, which are unlinkable. Then their balance of n should increase by k, but
instead they receive k updated tokens for a balance of n+ 1. Finally, in [39, 29,
9, 12] a user would have to participate in an interactive protocol to rate others.
Therefore the challenge remains to rewards users that rate accurately, whilst
preserving the anonymity of their ratings even with respect to the reputation
server. This is what we address in this paper.
1.1 Our work
We consider an anonymous peer rating system in which, at each round of inter-
action, users rate each other by providing feedback to the reputation server.
Our contribution is to allow accurate ratings to be incentivised and weighted
by reputation, whilst still ensuring anonymity of ratings. Achieving this is chal-
lenging for two reasons. First, the reputation used to weight feedback could be
used to de-anonymise a user. We can partially mitigate this by ensuring reputa-
tion is coarse-grained as in [8] (by rounding the reputation value, for instance),
which ensures that a user who has a unique reputation score does not reveal their
identity. The trade off between precision of reputation and size of anonymity sets
is further discussed in [45]. Second, and crucially, accurate ratings must be incen-
tivised without being de-anonymised. We achieve this by incentivising a large set
of ratings simultaneously, and rewarding the users responsible for such ratings.
With this approach, however, the anonymity set can be reduced substantially.
Indeed, a malicious reputation server could decide to only reward a small number
of ratings it seeks to de-anonymise, and then check which users are rewarded with
an increase in reputation. These users then must have authored these ratings.
A way to lessen the impact in both cases is to restrict access to reputation. A
specific trusted entity, the Reputation Holder, holds the reputations of users, and
the latter should only be revealed sparingly. We do not specify exactly when and
how reputations should be revealed in order to allow for a flexible scheme, and
because this has been discussed in the existing literature. For example, in [27,
47], users can prove their reputation and so can decide which users to reveal it
to. A simpler example is that a user would have to demonstrate a good reason
to learn another’s reputation from the Reputation Holder.
We go further and introduce a new entity, the Rewarder, who chooses which
ratings to reward, and who cannot see which users have their reputation increase.
As the Reputation Holder no longer knows which ratings were rewarded, they
cannot compare these ratings with the users that claim rewards and so reduce the
anonymity set. We formalise this in the Anonymity of Ratings under a Corrupt
Reputation Holder requirement. For completeness, we also consider the case that
the Reputation Holder and the Rewarder collude or are the same entity. Clearly
3
they learn that each user that was rewarded n times, authored n of the ratings
rewarded, however they should learn no more than this. We formalise this in our
Anonymity of Ratings under Full Corruption requirement.
Although we are aware that using reputation values and incentivising accu-
rate ratings both inescapably reduce the anonymity sets of ratings, in this work
we aim to provide the best anonymity achievable given the functionality. Fur-
thermore, we also must ensure that users do not attempt to subvert the system
by claiming rewards that they are not entitled to, by providing multiple ratings
on the same user per round, by lying about their reputation, or by framing other
users so that they seem to be cheating. We formalise this in our Fair Rewards,
Traceability3, Unforgeability of Reputation and Non–Frameability requirements.
In this work we first provide a model and security requirements for an anony-
mous peer rating system APR, which formalises the necessary privacy and se-
curity properties discussed above. We use property-based definitions, which are
intuitive and useful when proving security. We then give a construction that is
provably secure given these security requirements. Our construction makes use of
Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) [13], which we use to sign feedback. This
ensures that, whilst signed feedback are unlinkable, multiple feedback on the
same user can be detected, due to the user controlled linkability feature of DAA.
We modify the DAA scheme so that when giving feedback a user can prove they
have a particular reputation for that round, so that feedback can be weighted.
We then make use of Linkable Ring Signatures [36] to allow to incentivise users
who rate accurately. For every rating a freshly generated verification key is at-
tached, encrypted under the Rewarder’s public key. When the Rewarder rewards
a rating, they publish the corresponding decrypted verification keys. The user
can then sign a linkable ring signature with the corresponding secret key and
claim their incentive from the Reputation Holder. The linkability of the signa-
ture scheme can be used to detect if a user tries to claim for the same incentive
twice, whilst its anonymity ensures that ratings remain anonymous.
Although DAA and Linkable Ring Signature schemes are similar primitives,
we note that they have subtly different properties that make them exactly suited
to their particular role in building an APR scheme. As ring signature key pairs
can be generated without involving any central entity, this allows a new veri-
fication key to be generated for every rating. The fact that a central entity, in
our case the Reputation Holder, must authorise the creation of a new DAA key
pair, prevents sybil attacks. Otherwise, users could easily create multiple iden-
tities and rate other users as many times as they wish per round. Unlike group
signatures [16], DAA schemes do not allow a trusted opener to de–anonymise sig-
natures, ensuring that anonymity of ratings holds with respect to the Rewarder.
While the main aim of our anonymous peer rating system is to ensure anony-
mous and honest feedback, it is also important to consider how it is affected by
many other conventional attacks on rating systems. The unfair ratings attack [21]
is mitigated by the detection of multiple ratings per subject per round. The in-
3 Traceability here refers to the requirement that multiple ratings cannot be given on
the same subject per round.
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centives also encourage users to give more accurate feedback. The self–rating
or self–promoting attack [31] is mitigated by encouraging all users to give feed-
back on their own performance. Sybil attacks [22], where a user creates multiple
identities to join the system to give unfair feedback, can be mitigated by making
joining the system expensive, and by a robust registration process. This also mit-
igates against whitewashing attacks [19], where a user leaves and rejoins to shed
a bad reputation. The on-off attack [49], where a user behaves honestly to in-
crease their reputation before behaving dishonestly, can be somewhat mitigated
by adjusting the weighting of the final reputation formation in our system, so
that bad behaviour will cause the reputation to deteriorate quickly. Reputation
lag exploitation [34], where a user exploits the interval before the latest round
of ratings takes effect, cannot be prevented but, as before, we can mitigate it by
making the reputation deteriorate faster on bad behaviour.
2 Anonymous Peer Rating Systems: Definitions and
Security Models
In this section, we introduce and formally define an anonymous peer rating (APR)
system, and the security and privacy properties it should satisfy. We consider
a set of users U = {uidi} interacting with each other in rounds. At the end
of each round they rate each other’s performance, by anonymously sending a
numerical feedback alongside their reputation to the Rewarder. The Rewarder
collects ratings, discards multiple ratings on the same subject, and rewards accu-
rate feedback by outputting a set of incentives. A user claims to the Reputation
Holder that they were responsible for a number of these incentives. The final
reputation held by the Reputation Holder on a user is based on three compo-
nents: weighted feedback from other users, the number of incentives they have
successfully claimed, and their previous reputation. We present an illustration
of our model in Figure 1 and formally capture this as follows.
Fig. 1. Diagram illustrating our model.
Setup & Key Generation The Reputation Holder and Rewarder generate
their own key pairs. The group public key gpk = (param, rwpk, rhpk) consists of
the public keys of both entities.
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Setup(1τ , f1, f2)→ param: input a security parameter 1τ , and two generic func-
tions f1 and f2 which calculate the reputations of users. The function f1 is
input the number of ratings a user is being rewarded for, and outputs the
second component, r′′, of their reputation for this round. The function f2
is input the two components of a user’s reputation for this round, and their
reputation from the previous round, and outputs their final reputation for
this round4. Setup outputs the public parameters param which include f1, f2.
RHKeyGen(param)→ (rhsk, rhpk): performed by the Reputation Holder, out-
puts the Reputation Holder’s secret key rhsk and public key rhpk.
RWKeyGen(param)→ (rwsk, rwpk): performed by the Rewarder, outputs the
Rewarder’s secret key rwsk and public key rwpk.
Join When a user joins the system they engage in an interactive protocol with
the Reputation Holder after which they are issued with secret keys used to
provide anonymous ratings and to collect rewards for giving honest feedback.
We assume users must join the system before a round of ratings begins.
〈Join(gpk), Issue(rhsk, gpk)〉: a user uid joins the system by engaging in an
interactive protocol with the Reputation Holder. The user uid and Reputa-
tion Holder perform algorithms Join and Issue respectively. These are input a
state and an incoming message Min, and output an updated state, an outgo-
ing message Mout, and a decision, either cont, accept, or reject, which denote
whether the protocol is still ongoing, has ended in acceptance or has ended
in rejection respectively. (States are values necessary for the next stage of
the protocol.) The initial input to Join is the group public key, gpk, whereas
the initial input to Issue is the Reputation Holder’s secret key, rhsk, and
the group public key gpk. If the user uid accepts, Join privately outputs the
user’s secret key gsk[uid], and Issue outputs reg[uid], which stores the user’s
registration and will be used to later allocate that user a reputation.
Ratings at Round l Each user uid has a reputation r[uid, l] at round l, also
held by the Reputation Holder. We assume that reputation is coarse-grained,
which lessens the impact on anonymity with respect to the Reputation Holder.
At Round l, a user uid with reputation r forms a rating ρ with Rate on user uid′
based on a numerical feedback fb, which is sent to the Rewarder via a secure
anonymous channel5. For flexibility we do not specify the form of fb, in [50] this
a real number between 0 and 1. The user stores a trapdoor td for each rating for
later use when claiming incentives. The Rewarder can verify ratings with Verify.
After collecting the valid ratings weighted by reputation, the Rewarder calcu-
lates an intermediate value r′[uid, l] for each uid with FormRep1, through which
4 For example, in [50], f1 is simply the number of incentives received multiplied by
some weight, and f2 is the weighted sum of these components.
5 We require a secure channel to prevent the Reputation Holder from accessing the
ratings, and determining which ratings will be rewarded by following the strategy
of the Rewarder. This knowledge would allow the Reputation Holder to decrease
the anonymity set of the users claiming incentives, as in the case when both the
Rewarder and Reputation Holder are corrupted.
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it also detect multiple ratings on the same subject. This value captures the av-
erage feedback given on uid weighted by the reputation of the rater, and is sent
to the Reputation Holder via a secure authenticated channel.
Rate(gsk[uid], gpk, fb, uid′, l, r, ω)→ (ρ, td) : performed by the user with iden-
tifier uid, with input the user’s secret key gsk[uid], the group public key
gpk, a feedback fb, the user who they are rating uid′, the current round l,
their reputation r, and a reputation token ω output in the previous round
by AllocateRep. Outputs a rating ρ and a trapdoor td.
Verify(fb, uid′, l, r, ρ, gpk) → {0, 1}: a public function that is performed by the
Rewarder when receiving a rating tuple (fb, uid′, r, ρ). Outputs 1 if ρ is valid
on the feedback fb for user uid′ at round l for reputation r under the group
public key gpk, and 0 otherwise.
FormRep1(uid, l, (fb1, r1, ρ1), · · · (fbk, rk, ρk), gpk)→ r′[uid, l]: performed by the
Rewarder with input k valid rating tuples {(fbi, uid, ri, ρi) : i ∈ [1, k]} on
user uid at round l, and the group public key gpk. Outputs r′[uid, l] =∑k
i=1 rifbi∑k
i=1 ri
if all ratings originate from different users’ secret keys. Otherwise
outputs ⊥ (in practice also outputs ratings that should be discarded).
Incentivising accurate feedback The Rewarder compares each feedback on
uid′. If this is close to r′[uid′, l] then this rating will be considered to be accurate
and will be given an incentive. We define accurate as close to r′. However, our
model could simply be adapted to incorporate different metrics of accuracy.
The Rewarder inputs the k accurate ratings in this round to Incent, which
outputs k incentives which are broadcast publicly to all users. Incent must be
deterministic, to allow users to identify which incentives match their ratings.
A user collects all its incentives and can then use CollectIncent, along with the
trapdoors stored earlier, to output an incentive claim σ for each of their incen-
tives. They send these incentive claims to the Reputation Holder over a secure
authenticated channel. Incentive claims are verified by the Reputation Holder
with VerifyIncent. After gathering all the valid incentive claims, the Reputation
Holder calculates the second component r′′[uid, l + 1] of a user’s reputation at
round l with FormRep2, which also checks that no user has claimed the same
incentive twice. This value reflects how in line the feedback of uid is with respect
to other users’ feedback, incentivising users to give honest feedback.
Incent((fb1, uid1, r1, ρ1), · · · , (fbk, uidk, rk, ρk), l, rwsk, gpk) → t1, · · · , tk: a de-
terministic function performed by the Rewarder on input k rating tuples
{(fbi, uidi, ri, ρi) : i ∈ [1, k]} from round l and its secret key rwsk. Outputs
k incentives t1, · · · , tk.
CollectIncent(uid, (fb, uid′, l, r, ρ, td), t1, · · · , tk, gpk)→ σ: performed by the user
uid who gave the rating tuple (fb, uid′, r, ρ) for round l corresponding to
trapdoor td, with input the incentives output by the Rewarder t1, · · · , tk.
Outputs an incentive claim σ if the rating tuple (fb, uid′, r, ρ) corresponds
to an incentive in list t1, · · · , tk and ⊥ otherwise.
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VerifyIncent(uid, σ, t1, · · · , tk, gpk)→ {0, 1}: performed by the Reputation Holder
when receiving an incentive claim σ from user uid on incentives t1, · · · , tk.
Outputs 1 if the incentive claim is valid on uid, t1, · · · tk and 0 otherwise.
FormRep2(uid, σ1, · · ·σk1 , t1, · · · , tk2 , gpk)→ r′′[uid, l]: performed by the Rep-
utation Holder with input a user uid, k1 valid incentive claims σ1, · · ·σk1
and k2 incentives t1, · · · , tk2 . Outputs r′′[uid, l] = f1(k1) if no incentive has
been claimed twice, and otherwise ⊥.
Allocate reputation for next round For the first round, all users’ reputations
are set to an initial value. The reputation of user uid for round l+1, r[uid, l+1],
is set by the Reputation Holder as f2(r
′[uid, l], r′′[uid, l], r[uid, l]) combining the
user’s previous reputation and the two intermediate values r′[uid, l], r′′[uid, l].
This reputation value r[uid, l+1], which we refer to as r, and a reputation token
ω obtained from AllocateRep are given to the user via a secure authenticated
channel to allow them to prove they have this reputation in the next round.
AllocateRep(uid, r, l, rhsk, reg)→ ω: performed by the Reputation Holder with
input a user uid with reputation r during round l, the Reputation Holder’s
secret key rhsk and the registration table reg. Outputs reputation token ω.
2.1 Security Requirements
An APR system must satisfy Correctness, as well as the following security re-
quirements: Anonymity of Ratings under Full Corruption, which formalises the
strongest anonymity that can be achieved when the Rewarder and Reputation
Holder are corrupted; Anonymity of Ratings under a Corrupt Reputation Holder,
which ensures that ratings cannot be de-anonymised or linked by the Reputa-
tion Holder6; Traceability, which ensures that multiple ratings cannot be given on
the same user per round; Non–Frameability, which ensures that users cannot be
impersonated when giving ratings or claiming incentives; Unforgeability of Rep-
utation, which ensures that a user cannot lie about their reputation, and Fair
Rewards, which ensures that users can only successfully claim for the number
of incentives they were awarded. We focus here on the Anonymity of Ratings
and Fair Rewards requirements as these are the most novel, directly relating
to the problem of incentivising anonymous ratings. However, the Traceability,
Non–Frameability and Unforgeability of Reputation requirements are given in
the full version of this paper [26].
We provide definitions in the computational model of cryptography. These
are typically formulated as experiments in which an adversary, having access to
a certain number of oracles, is challenged to produce an output. Such output
captures an instance of the system in which the security requirement does not
hold. In Figure 2, we provide the oracles used in our security requirements:
AddU, SndToU, SndToRH, AllocateRep, USK, Rate, TD, Incent, Collect, based
on notation from [6]. We give a high level description below:
6 The case of a corrupt Rewarder is captured in the Anonymity of Ratings under Full
Corruption requirement.
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– AddU (Add User): creates an honest user uid.
– SndToU (Send to User): creates honest users when the adversary has cor-
rupted the Reputation Holder. The adversary impersonates the RH, and
engages in a < Join, Issue > protocol with an honest user.
– SndToRH (Send to RH): creates corrupted users, when the adversary has not
corrupted the Reputation Holder. The adversary impersonates a user and
engages in a < Join, Issue > protocol with an honest RH.
– AllocateRep: allows an adversary to obtain outputs of AllocateRep.
– USK: allows an adversary to obtain the secret key of an honest user.
– Rate: allows an adversary to perform Rate on behalf of an honest user.
– TD: allows an adversary to obtain a trapdoor associated to a rating that has
been obtained through the Rate oracle.
– Incent: allows an adversary to obtain outputs of Incent.
– Collect: allows an adversary to obtain outputs of CollectIncent for a rating
that has been output by the Rate oracle and then input to the Incent oracle.
All oracles have access to the following records maintained as global state
which are initially set to ∅:
HL List of uids of honest users. New honest users can be added by queries to
the AddU oracle (for an honest RH) or SndToU oracle (for a corrupt RH).
CL List of corrupt users that have requested to join the group. New corrupt
users can be added through the SndToRH oracle if the RH is honest. If the
RH is corrupt, we do not keep track of corrupt users.
AL List of all queries to the AllocateRep oracle for corrupt users.
SL List of queries and outputs from the Rate oracle.
TDL List of queries to the TD oracle.
IL List of queries, and outputs of the Incent oracle.
CLL List of queries, and outputs of the Collect oracle.
Correctness An APR system is correct, if when Rate is input an honestly gen-
erated secret key and a reputation token, it will output a valid rating. Provided
all ratings input to FormRep1 originate from different users it will output the
correct function. Also, if Incent and CollectIncent are performed honestly on k
valid ratings, the resulting incentive claims will be valid. Provided each incentive
is only claimed once, FormRep2 will output f1(k). We give the full requirement
in the full version of this paper [26].
Anonymity of Ratings We now give the requirements for both corruption
settings that ensure ratings cannot be de-anonymised or linked by user, pro-
vided multiple ratings on the same user per round are not given. We also must
ensure that ratings cannot be linked to the corresponding incentive claim. This
is crucial to ensuring ratings are anonymous, as incentive claims are sent fully
authenticated and so, if linkable to the corresponding rating, they could be used
to de-anonymise such ratings.
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AddU(uid):
if uid ∈ CL ∪ HL return ⊥
HL← HL ∪ {uid}, decuid ← cont,gsk[uid]←⊥
Stuidjn ← (gpk), Stuidiss ← (rhsk, gpk, uid),Mjn ←⊥
(Stuidjn ,Miss, dec
uid)←$ Join(Stuidjn ,Mjn)
While decuid = cont
(Stuidiss ,Mjn, dec
uid)←$ Issue(Stuidiss ,Miss)
If decuid = accept reg[uid]← Stuidiss
(Stuidjn ,Miss, dec
uid)←$ Join(Stuidjn ,Mjn)
gsk[uid]← Stuidjn , return reg[uid]
SndToU(uid,Min):
if uid /∈ HL
HL← HL ∪ {uid}
gsk[uid]←⊥,Min ←⊥, Stuidjn ← gpk
(Stuidjn ,Mout, dec)←$ Join(Stuidjn ,Min)
if dec = accept gsk[uid]← Stuidjn
return (Mout, dec)
SndToRH(uid,Min):
if uid ∈ HL return ⊥
if uid /∈ CL CL← CL ∪ {uid}, decuid ← cont
if decuid 6= cont return ⊥
if stuidIssue undefined st
uid
Issue ← (rhsk, gpk)
(Stuidiss ,Mout, dec
uid)←$ Issue(Stuidiss ,Min)
if decuid = accept
reg[uid]← Stuidiss return (Mout, reg[uid])
else return Mout
USK(uid):
if uid /∈ HL return ⊥ else return (gsk[uid])
AllocateRep(uid, r, l):
if uid ∈ CL AL← AL ∪ (uid, r, l)
return ω ← AllocateRep(uid, r, l, rhsk, reg)
Rate(uid, uid′, l, fb, r, ω):
if uid /∈ HL or gsk[uid] =⊥ return ⊥
(ρ, td)←$Rate(gsk[uid], gpk, fb, uid′, l, r, ω)
SL← SL ∪ {uid, uid′, fb, r, ρ, td, l}, return ρ
TD(fb, uid′, l, r, ρ):
if (·, uid′, fb, r, ρ, td, l) ∈ SL TDL← TDL ∪ {((fb, uid′, l, r, ρ)} return td
else return ⊥
Incent((fb1, uid1, r1, ρ1), · · · , (fbk, uidk, rk, ρk), l):
if |{i ∈ [k] : (·, uidi, fbi, ri, ρi, ·, l) ∈ RL†}| > 1 return ⊥
if |{i ∈ [k] : (·, uidi, fbi, ri, ρi, ·, l) ∈ RL†}| = 1
/ Check if challenge rating is input in anon-rh game, otherwise RL† = ∅
Parse RL† = {(uid∗b′ , uid′∗, fb∗, r∗, ρ∗b′ , td∗b′ , l∗) : b′ ∈ {0, 1}}
k ← k + 1, (fbk, uidk, rk, ρk)← (fb∗, uid′∗, r∗, ρ∗1−b)
/ Rating from other challenged user added to the inputs
t1, · · · , tk ←
Incent((fb1, uid1, r1, ρ1), · · · , (fbk, uidk, rk, ρk), l, rwsk, gpk)
∀i ∈ [k] if (ti, ·) /∈ IL IL← IL ∪ (ti, (fbi, uidi, ri, ρi))
choose random permutation Π, return tΠ(1), · · · , tΠ(k)
Collect((t1, · · · , tk), l):
∀i ∈ [k] if (ti, (fbi, uid′i, ri, ρi)) /∈ IL return ⊥
∀i ∈ [k] if (uidi, uid′i, fbi, ri, ρi, tdi, l) /∈ SL ∪ RL ∪ RL† return ⊥
if |{(uidi, uid′i, fbi, ri, ρi, tdi, l) : i ∈ [k]} ∩ RL| = 1
/ Check if challenge rating is input in anon-fullcorr game, otherwise RL = ∅
Parse RL = {(uid∗b′ , uid′∗, fb∗, r∗, ρ∗b′ , td∗b′ , l∗) : b′ ∈ {0, 1}}, k ← k + 1
(uidk, uid
′
k, fbk, rk, ρk, tdk)← (uid∗1−b, uid′∗, fb∗, r∗, ρ∗1−b, td∗1−b)
/ Rating from other challenged user added to the inputs
tk ← Incent((fbk, uid′k, rk, ρk), l, rwsk, gpk)
CLL← ∅, ∀i ∈ [k]
σi ←$CollectIncent(uidi, (fbi, uid′i, l, ri, ρi, tdi), t1, · · · tk, gpk)
CLL← CLL ∪ {((fbi, uid′i, ri, ρi), uidi, σi, t1, · · · tk, l)}
choose random permutation Π for j = 1, · · · , k
return {uidΠ(j), σΠ(j) : j ∈ [1, k]}
Fig. 2. Oracles used in our Security Requirements
Anonymity of Ratings under Full Corruption. We first formally define anonymity
of ratings in the case both the Rewarder and the Reputation Holder have been
corrupted. In this setting, the following attack can always be mounted: The
adversary, having corrupted the Rewarder and Reputation Holder, wishes to de-
anonymise a specific rating and so simply only rewards this rating. The author of
the rating then claims their reward from the Reputation Holder, revealing their
identity. Such an attack is unavoidable when incentivising accurate feedback.
However, we can still provide some guarantee of anonymity, namely that the
adversary should learn no more than the following: a user that has been rewarded
n times per round is responsible for n of the rewarded ratings for that round.
When n = 1 the above attack still holds, but this dishonest behaviour of the
Rewarder can be detected as only one incentive would be publicly broadcast. Our
security requirement achieves this by allowing the challenge rating to be input
to the Collect oracle, on the condition that an additional rating authored by
the other challenged user is added to the inputs. By including ratings originating
from both challenged users, the incentives claimed by both of these users will
increase by 1, and so the adversary cannot use this to trivially win. We note
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that this notion implies the anonymity requirement when just the Rewarder is
corrupted, i.e., it is the strongest of the two requirements.
In the security game the Reputation Holder and Rewarder are corrupted,
and so the adversary can create corrupted users. The adversary chooses two
honest users, as well as a feedback, a user who is the subject of the feedback,
and a reputation. The adversary must give reputation tokens for each user for
this reputation. The adversary is returned with a challenge rating authored by
one of these users, with this reputation, on this feedback and user (subject),
and they must guess which user authored the rating. The challenge rating as
well as another rating authored by the other challenged user is saved in RL,
for later use in the Collect oracle. The adversary can create honest users with
the SndToU oracle and obtain their ratings with the Rate oracle. However they
cannot query to the Rate oracle either of the users that were challenged as well as
the challenge subject/round. Otherwise the FormRep1 algorithm could be used to
trivially win, due to the detection of multiple ratings on the same user/round. We
also must check that both ratings computed from the challenged users are valid,
to ensure that both ω0 or ω1 output by the adversary were correctly formed.
The adversary can also reveal the trapdoor from each Rate oracle query with
the TD oracle, but not for the challenge ratings as this would lead to a trivial win
by detecting double claims with FormRep2. They also have access to an Incent
oracle. The adversary can query incentives from the Incent oracle, that originate
from the Rate oracle, to the Collect oracle. If they include the challenge rating,
an additional rating from the other challenged user is added to the inputs. The
adversary is returned with the incentive claims for these ratings along with the
user who claims them. This captures the fact that claiming incentives should
not violate the anonymity of ratings. We give the full game below:
Experiment: Expanon-fullcorrA,APR (τ, f1, f2)
b←$ {0, 1},RL,RL† ← ∅, param←$Setup(1τ , f1, f2), (rhsk, rhpk)←$RHKeyGen(param)
(rwsk, rwpk)←$RWKeyGen(param), gpk ← (param, rwpk, rhpk)
(st, uid∗0, uid
∗
1, l
∗, fb∗, uid′∗, r∗, ω0, ω1)←$ASndToU,Rate,TD,Incent,Collect(choose, gpk, rhsk, rwsk)
if uid∗0, uid
∗
1 /∈ HL or gsk[uid∗0],gsk[uid∗1] =⊥ return ⊥
∀b′ ∈ {0, 1} (td∗b′ , ρ∗b′)←$Rate(gsk[uid∗b′ ], gpk, fb∗, uid′∗, l∗, r∗, ωb′)
/ Compute both ratings for use in Collect oracle and to check ω0, ω1
RL← {(uid∗b′ , uid′∗, fb∗, r∗, ρ∗b′ , td∗b′ , l∗) : b′ ∈ {0, 1}} / Save both ratings for use in Collect
d←$ASndToU,Rate,TD,Incent,Collect(guess, st, ρ∗b)
if ρ∗0 or ρ
∗
1 =⊥ or ∃b′ ∈ {0, 1} s.t (uid∗b′ , uid′∗, ·, ·, ·, ·, l∗) ∈ SL
/ Check ω0, ω1 are both valid and FormRep1 can’t be used to trivially win by detecting multiple ratings
return d←$ {0, 1}
if d = b return 1 else return 0
An APR system satisfies Anonymity of Ratings under Full Corruption if for all
functions f1, f2, for all polynomial time adversaries A, the following advantage
is negligible in τ :
|Pr[Expanon−fullcorrA,APR (τ, f1, f2) = 1]− 1/2|.
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Anonymity of Ratings under a Corrupt Reputation Holder. We next define
anonymity in the setting where the Reputation Holder has been corrupted, but
not the Rewarder. This means that the adversary now does not know which
ratings have been rewarded. The challenge rating and a rating authored by the
other challenged user are now stored in list RL†. The adversary has full access
to the Collect oracle, modelling the role of the Reputation Holder. However,
if the challenge rating is input to the Incent oracle, the rating authored by
the other challenged user stored in RL† is also added to the inputs. The Incent
oracle shuffles the outputs. This represents that the Reputation Holder no longer
knows which rating is linked to each incentive.
Experiment: Expanon-rhA,APR (τ, f1, f2)
b←$ {0, 1},RL,RL† ← ∅, param←$Setup(1τ , f1, f2), (rhsk, rhpk)←$RHKeyGen(param)
(rwsk, rwpk)←$RWKeyGen(param), gpk ← (param, rwpk, rhpk)
(st, uid∗0, uid
∗
1, l
∗, fb∗, uid′∗, r∗, ω0, ω1)←$ASndToU,Rate,TD,Incent,Collect(choose, gpk, rhsk)
if uid∗0, uid
∗
1 /∈ HL or gsk[uid∗0],gsk[uid∗1] =⊥ return ⊥
∀b′ ∈ {0, 1} (td∗b′ , ρ∗b′)←$Rate(gsk[uid∗b′ ], gpk, fb∗, uid′∗, l∗, r∗, ωb′)
/ Compute both ratings for use in Incent oracle and to check ω0, ω1
RL† ← {(uid∗b′ , uid′∗, fb∗, r∗, ρ∗b′ , td∗b′ , l∗) : b′ ∈ {0, 1}} / Save both ratings for use in Incent
d←$ASndToU,Rate,TD,Incent,Collect(guess, st, ρ∗b)
if ρ∗0 or ρ
∗
1 =⊥ or ∃b′ ∈ {0, 1} s.t (uid∗b′ , uid′∗, ·, ·, ·, ·, l∗) ∈ SL
/ Check ω0, ω1 are both valid and FormRep1 can’t be used to trivially win by detecting multiple ratings
return d←$ {0, 1}
if d = b return 1 else return 0
An APR system satisfies Anonymity of Ratings under a Corrupt Reputa-
tion Holder if for all f1, f2, for all polynomial time adversaries A, the following
advantage is negligible in τ :
|Pr[Expanon−rhA,APR (τ, f1, f2) = 1]− 1/2|.
Fair Rewards This requirement ensures that an adversary cannot increase
the number of incentives they were allocated, or steal incentives allocated to
other users. In the security game the Rewarder and the Reputation Holder are
corrupted, so the adversary can create corrupted users. The adversary is given
the SndToU and Rate oracles to create honest users, and obtain their ratings.
They have access to the Collect oracles to obtain incentive claims on incentives
obtained from the Rate oracle followed by the Incent oracle. They have access
to the trapdoor oracle, to obtain trapdoors associated to ratings output by Rate.
The adversary must choose k1 incentives obtained from the Incent oracle, and
k2 valid incentive claims, not output by the Collect oracle, corresponding to a
single user identifier. If FormRep2 doesn’t detect cheating, and more incentive
claims are output than incentives corresponding to ratings not obtained through
the Rate oracle or queried to the trapdoor oracle, then the adversary wins. We
give the full game below:
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Experiment: Expfair−rewA,APR (τ, f1, f2)
RL,RL† ← ∅, param←$Setup(1τ , f1, f2), (rhsk, rhpk)←$RHKeyGen(param)
(rwsk, rwpk)←$RWKeyGen(param), gpk ← (param, rwpk, rhpk)
(uid, (σ1, · · ·σk2), (t1, · · · tk1), l)←$ASndToU,Rate,TD,Incent,Collect(gpk, rwsk, rhsk)
if ∃i ∈ [k1] s.t (ti, (fbi, uid′i, ri, ρi)) /∈ IL return 0
return 1 if the following conditions hold
∀i ∈ [k2] σi not returned by Collect oracle and VerifyIncent(uid, σi, (t1, · · · , tk1)) = 1 and
FormRep2(uid, σ1, · · ·σk2 , t1, · · · tk1 , gpk) 6=⊥ and
k2 > |{i ∈ [k1] : (·, uid′i, fbi, ri, ρi, ·, l) /∈ SL or (fbi, uid′i, l, ri, ρi) ∈ TDL}|
An APR system satisfies Fair Rewards if for all functions f1, f2, for all poly-
nomial time adversaries A, the advantage Pr[Expfair−rewA,APR (τ, f1, f2) = 1] is neg-
ligible in τ .
3 Construction
We propose a construction for an APR system which makes use of three building
blocks: Linkable Ring Signatures (LRS), a modified Direct Anonymous Attesta-
tion (DAA*) scheme and a public–key encryption scheme.
Ring signatures [46] allow users to sign on behalf of a ring of users, with-
out revealing their identity within the ring. There is no central entity involved,
and users generate their own signing and verification keys. Linkable ring signa-
tures [36] allow for the public linking of signatures by signer. We exploit these
features to allow for incentivising accurate ratings as follows. Each rating in-
cludes a freshly generated verification key encrypted under the public key of the
Rewarder, and the user who has generated the rating stores the corresponding
signing key as a trapdoor. The Rewarder publishes these decrypted verification
keys as incentives. Then to claim an incentive the user uses the signing key to
sign a ring signature on their user identifier with respect to the ring of verifica-
tion keys given as incentives. The anonymity of Linkable Ring Signatures ensures
that claiming incentives will not de-anonymise ratings. The unforgeability prop-
erty ensures that only users that have been rewarded can claim an incentive, and
the linking function ensures that only one reward can be claimed per rating.
Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) [13] allows users to sign on behalf
of a group, whilst remaining anonymous within the group. The user-controlled
linkability feature, where two signatures on the same basename by the same
user are linked, whilst all other signatures are unlinkable, can be used to detect
multiple feedback on the same subject. In our setting, the basename can be
set to be the user who is the subject of the feedback and the round. In our
system we also wish to ensure feedback is weighted by reputation. However, this
must also be balanced with anonymity of feedback. For this to be possible the
reputation of users must be coarse-grained enough that they cannot be identified
by their reputation. To ensure this, we bind reputation into a Direct Anonymous
Attestation scheme, which we will call a DAA* scheme. Now a user proves their
reputation when signing, allowing for the weighting of feedback.
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3.1 Public-Key Encryption Schemes
Our scheme makes use of a public–key encryption scheme, which consists of the
following: EncSetup(1τ ), which is input the security parameter 1τ and outputs
parameters paramEnc; EncKeyGen(paramEnc), which is input the parameters and
outputs secret key sk and the public key pk; Enc(pk,m), which is input the public
key pk and a message m from the message space, and outputs a ciphertext c;
and Dec(sk, c), which is input the secret key sk and a ciphertext c, and outputs
a message m or a decryption failure ⊥. We require the encryption scheme to be
correct and satisfy indistinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks.
3.2 Linkable Ring Signatures
We use the model in [4] for one-time linkable ring signatures, which gives the
strongest security yet. The scheme from [4] has the shortest signatures to date.
We give the security requirements: Correctness Linkability, Linkable Anonymity,
Non–Frameability and Unforgeability in the full version [26].
Definition 1 (Linkable Ring Signatures.). A linkable ring signature scheme LRS
is given by polynomial time algorithms (LRKeyGen, LRSign, LRVerify, LRLink):
LRKeyGen(1τ ): takes as input the security parameter 1τ and outputs a pair
(vk, sk) of verification and signing keys.
LRSign(sk,m,R): takes as input a signing key sk, a message m, and a list of
verification keys R = (vk1, ..., vkq), and outputs a signature Σ.
LRVerify(R,m,Σ): takes as input a ring R = (vk1, ..., vkq), a message m, and
a signature Σ, and outputs either 0 or 1.
LRLink(Σ1, Σ2,m1,m2) : is input two signatures/ messages, outputs 0 or 1.
3.3 DAA* Signatures
The security model of DAA* closely follows that of pre–DAA signatures [7]. We
give the security requirements for DAA* signatures in the full version [26].
Definition 2 (DAA*.). A DAA* scheme consists of the following algorithms:
DAA*Setup(1τ ): input the security parameter τ , outputs parameters param.
DAA*KeyGen(param): input the parameters param, outputs the group public
key gpk, and the issuing secret key isk.
〈DAA*Join(gpk),DAA*Issue(isk, gpk)〉: a user i joins the group by engaging in
an interactive protocol with the Issuer. The user i and Issuer perform algorithms
DAA*Join and DAA*Issue respectively. These are input a state and an incoming
message respectively, and output an updated state, an outgoing message, and a
decision, either cont, accept, or reject. The initial input to DAA*Join is the group
public key, whereas the initial input to DAA*Issue is the issuer secret key, isk,
and the group public key. If the issuer accepts, DAA*Join has a private output
of gsk[i], DAA*Issue has a private output of reg[i].
DAA*Update(r, t, isk, i, reg, gpk): input a reputation r, a time t, the issuing
secret key isk, a user i, the registration list reg, gpk. Outputs a token ω.
14
DAA*Sign(bsn,m,gsk[i], ω, gpk, r, t): input a basename bsn, a message m, a
user secret key gsk[i], a token ω output by DAA*Update, a group public key
gpk, a reputation r and time t. It checks that ω is valid for user i, reputation r
and time t and outputs a signature Ω. Otherwise it outputs ⊥.
DAA*Verify(bsn,m, r, t, Ω, gpk): input a basename bsn, a message m, a rep-
utation r, time t, a signature Ω, and a group public key gpk. It outputs 1 if Ω
is valid for the item I, reputation r and time t, and 0 otherwise.
DAA*Link((bsn0,m0, r0, t0, Ω0), (bsn1,m1, r1, t1, Ω1), gpk): input two signa-
tures Ω0, Ω1 each on a basename, a message, a reputation, a time, and a group
public key gpk. It outputs 1 if both signatures are valid, bsn0 = bsn1 and the
two signatures have the same author, and 0 otherwise.
DAA*IdentifyT (T , gsk): outputs 1 if T corresponds to a valid transcript of
< DAA*Join,DAA*Issue >, with output gsk to DAA*Join, and otherwise 0.
DAA*IdentifyS(bsn,m, r, t, Ω, gsk): outputs 1 if the signature Ω could have
been produced with user secret key gsk, and 0 otherwise.
3.4 Our Construction
We now present our construction that securely realizes an APR system, using
a PKE scheme, an LRS scheme and a DAA* scheme. We give our construction
in Figure 3, except for the < Join, Issue > protocol which is identical to the
< DAA*Join,DAA*Issue > protocol for DAA* signatures such that DAA*Join is
input rhpk, and DAA*Issue is input (rhsk, rhpk).
3.5 Security of Our Construction
We show that our construction satisfies the security requirements for an APR
system defined in Section 2. We need one further property than the security
of the LRS and DAA* building blocks. In the < Join, Issue > protocol, the RH
must be sent an SPK of the user’s secret key. SPK denotes a signature proof
of knowledge, that is a non-interactive transformation of a proof PK. These
proofs can be extended to be online-extractable [24], by verifiably encrypting
the witness to a public key defined in the common reference string. We require
the proof system to be simulation-sound, online–extractable and zero-knowledge.
We give further details on the proof protocols used in the full version [26].
Theorem 1. The construction presented in Figure 3 is a secure APR, as defined
in Section 2, if the LRS scheme, DAA* scheme and PKE scheme used are secure,
and the SPK is online extractable, simulation sound, and zero-knowledge.
The detailed proofs of Lemmata 1-6 are given in the full version [26].
Lemma 1. The construction satisfies Anonymity of Ratings under Full–Corruption
if the LRS and DAA* schemes satisfy Anonymity, and the SPK is zero-knowledge.
Proof intuition. A distinguisher between the original game and one where the
challenged user identifiers are swapped in the Collect oracle when the challenge
rating is input, can break the anonymity of linkable ring signatures. A reduction
can now be made to the anonymity of our DAA* scheme.
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Setup(1τ , f1, f2)
return (DAA*Setup(1τ ),EncSetup(1τ ), f1, f2)
RHKeyGen(paramDAA*, paramEnc, f1, f2)
(rhsk, rhpk)←$DAA*KeyGen(paramDAA*) return (rhsk, rhpk)
RWKeyGen(paramDAA*, paramEnc, f1, f2)
(rwsk, rwpk)←$EncKeyGen(paramEnc) return (rwsk, rwpk)
Rate(gsk[uid], gpk, fb, uid′, l, r, ω)
(vk, td)←$ LRKeyGen(1τ ), v˜k←$Enc(rwpk, vk)
Ω←$DAA*Sign((uid′, l), (fb, v˜k),gsk[uid], ω, gpk, r, l), ρ← (Ω, v˜k)
Verify(fb, uid′, l, r, ρ = (Ω, v˜k), gpk)
DAA*Verify((uid′, l), (fb, v˜k), r, l, Ω, gpk)
FormRep1(uid, l, (fb1, r1, (Ω1, ˜vk1)), · · · , (fbk, rk, (Ωk, ˜vkk)), gpk)
∀(i, j) ∈ [k] s.t i 6= j if DAA*Link(((uid, l), (fbi, ˜vki), ri, l, Ωi), ((uid, l), (fbj , ˜vkj), rj , l, Ωj), gpk) = 1 return ⊥
else return
∑k
i=1 rifbi∑k
i=1 ri
Incent({(fbi, uidi, ri, (Ωi, ˜vki)) : i ∈ [k]}, l, rwsk, gpk)
∀i ∈ [k] ti ← Dec(rwsk, ˜vki) return (t1, · · · , tk)
CollectIncent(uid, (fb, uid′, l, r, ρ, td), t1, · · · , tk, gpk)
return σ←$ LRSign(td, uid, (t1, · · · tk))
VerifyIncent(uid, σ, t1, · · · , tk, gpk)
return LRVerify((t1, · · · tk), uid, σ)
FormRep2(uid, σ1, · · ·σk1 , t1, · · · , tk2 , gpk)
∀i, j ∈ [k1] s.t i 6= j if LRLink(σi, σj , uid, uid) = 1 return ⊥ else return f1(k1)
AllocateRep(uid, r[uid, l], l, isk, reg)
return DAA*Update(r[uid, l], l, isk, uid, reg, gpk)
Fig. 3. Our APR construction
Lemma 2. The construction satisfies Anonymity of Ratings under a Corrupt
Reputation Holder if the DAA* scheme satisfies Anonymity and the PKE scheme
satisfies indistinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks, and the
SPK is zero-knowledge.
Proof intuition. A distinguisher between the original game and a game where
the Collect oracle, on input an incentive from the ratings in RL†, swaps the
user identifiers, can break the IND–CCA2 security of the encryption scheme. A
reduction can now be made to the anonymity of our DAA* scheme.
Lemma 3. The construction satisfies Traceability if the DAA* scheme satisfies
both Traceability and Non–Frameability, and the SPK is online extractable and
simulation sound.
Lemma 4. The construction satisfies Non–Frameability if the LRS and DAA*
schemes both satisfy Non–Frameability, and the SPK is zero-knowledge.
Lemma 5. The construction satisfies Unforgeability of Reputation if the DAA*
scheme satisfies Unforgeability of Reputation, and the SPK is online extractable
and simulation sound.
Lemma 6. The construction satisfies Fair Rewards if the LRS scheme satisfies
Linkability and Non–Frameability.
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Proof intuition. An adversary breaks fair rewards either by “stealing” an incen-
tive from an honest user, in which case we could break the non–frameability
of LRS, or by expanding the incentives that were fairly allocated to corrupted
users, in which case we could break the Linkability of LRS.
3.6 Concrete Instantiation and Efficiency
We give a DAA* construction, and prove that it securely realizes a DAA* scheme
in the full version [26], assuming the LRSW [37], DCR [41], and DDH assump-
tions and the random oracle model. The < DAA*Join,DAA*Issue > protocol
already contains a suitable SPK of the user secret key. A linkable ring signature
scheme that securely realises the model in Section 3.2 is given in [4]. An incentive
claim would have size log(l)poly(τ), where l is the number of incentives. This
is the current state of the art for linkable ring signatures, and is reasonable,
albeit large. Ratings are reasonably small, and consist of 7 τ -bit elements, and
an encryption of 3 commitments.
4 Conclusion and Future Work
We give a security model for an anonymous peer rating system APR that allows
accurate ratings to be incentivised, feedback to be weighted by reputation, and
multiple feedback on the same subject to be detected, whilst still ensuring ratings
remain anonymous. We use Linkable Ring Signatures and a modification of DAA
to build a construction that is secure under these requirements.
The DAA and Linkable Ring Signature primitives are not inherent in realising
our anonymous peer ratings system. Different primitives could be used to build
constructions that are more efficient or rely on different assumptions.
In a peer rating system, a high reputation score leads to a real payoff for
users, corresponding to an increase in utility. When increasing one’s utility is
the ultimate goal, game theory helps to gain new insights. A peer rating system
formalised through game theory, which also follows the strategies of weighting
feedback and incentivising accurate ratings, is proposed in [50] and experimen-
tally simulated when used in collaborative intrusion detection systems in [20].
It is shown in [50] to what extent it pays off for users to rate accurately given
the size of incentives and the size of the coalition(s) of dishonest users. However,
anonymity of ratings is not taken into account and a fully trusted central au-
thority receives the ratings and issues the incentives. As future work, we want to
determine game theoretically whether our scheme incentivises accurate ratings.
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